THE APPEAL OF RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE THEORY
Shelby D. Hunt's (2000) welcome volume-titled A General Theory of Competition-addresses key issues in the modern analysis of industries and firms. The book considers major questions concerning industrial competition, organization, and policy. It is important and compelling reading.
One of the reasons for the appeal of the book is that mainstream economists have increasingly sidestepped these topics. Modern industrial economics is, instead, very much an exercise in applied mathematical game theory. The descent of modern industrial economics into empirically detached mathematical formalism can be dated to the final third of the twentieth century. Before we turn to Hunt's (2000) own theoretical contribution, it will be useful to consider this development and the modern intellectual context in which A General Theory of Competition emerges.
In the 1945-1965 period, industrial economics was dominated by the theory of "workable competition" of the institutional economist John Maurice Clark (1940 Clark ( , 1961 , by the innovative theory of "monopolistic competition" of Edward Chamberlin (1933 Chamberlin ( , 1951 , and by the mainstream theoretical contribution of Joe S. Bain (1956 Bain ( , 1959 . A dominant idea was that the market structure of an industry determined both firm conduct and performance. This was the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. Overall, the policy approach was pragmatic and empirically grounded. For most industrial economists, neither free competition nor monopoly was regarded as panaceas.
In the United States, in the late 1960s, there was a policy shift against large firms, on the grounds that their existence was not required by economics of scale. In the spirit of Ralph Nader, there was the "Neal Task Force" and Senator Hart's Industrial Reorganization Act. Then came the University of Chicago counterattack, in defense of large firms and against government intervention. As Dennis O'Brien (1998, 29) comments on this episode, The counter-attack was astonishingly successful. The Chicago economists were so good that they not merely blew away the intellectual basis of the Neal Task Force's position; they blew away industrial economics as well, and, with it, competition policy. . . . Thus it came to be largely accepted, at least for policy purposes, that concentration reflects efficiency . . . that there is no welfare loss from concentration . . . and that, if there were any possible benefits from deconcentration, these were certainly outweighed by the costs. . . . In summary, game theory filled a vacuum left by the destruction of industrial economics . . . that destruction was ideological in origin, and . . . the very detachment of game theory from genuine industrial data was part of its attraction as device for filling the vacuum.
As a result, the twin eruptions of Chicago-style ideological apologetics in the 1970s and the subsequent mathematical formalism of the 1980s and 1990s have largely destroyed meaningful and relevant industrial economics. It is in this tragic context that Hunt's (2000) book is written. It is significant that its author is a professor of marketing rather than a professor of economics. Today, his ideas would not make much headway in many leading economics departments. But his themes would have found an audience in most economics departments prior to 1970.
The first four chapters of Hunt's (2000) work review much of the achievement of pre-1970 industrial economics. Hunt places special and laudable emphasis on the contributions of Clark (1961) , Chamberlin (1933) , and Edith Penrose (1959) . He explains their common understanding of competition as a dynamic process, involving a population of heterogeneous and varied firms. Against this, there was the tendency of Joan Robinson (1933) and others to build industrial economics on the concept of equilibrium. Hunt rightly emphasizes that equilibrium-based analysis actually obliterates both the heterogeneity and dynamism that marks real-world industrial competition.
Faced with such dilemmas, modern industrial economists can choose to explore the endless formal niceties and complexities of equilibrium models, or they can adopt a less formal approach that is much more orientated toward the real world. Regrettably, most economists today-perhaps in pursuit of tenure and glittering prizes-choose formalism. Hunt (2000) , to his great credit, chooses realism. Not only does he eschew the formalist origami of what passes as "industrial economics" today, but he also lambastes the barren ethical relativism that pervades much of social science. His work is imbued throughout with a commendable spirit of realism and relevance.
Hunt (2000) is unashamedly eclectic. He attempts to use the best of various heterodox approaches to the theory of industries and firms. He is inspired especially by evolutionary, competence-based, and resource-based theories of the firm. More generally, he acknowledges the influence of Austrian economics, transaction cost economics, institutional economics, and socioeconomics. While building on the existing competence-based or resource-based theories of the firm, Hunt exposes limitations in some versions of this approach, especially when notions of "perfect competition" or equilibrium reenter by the back door.
The first four chapters of his book, devoted to the survey of relevant literature, are excellent background reading. Here I have minor criticisms only. Alongside J. M. Clark, Chamberlin, and Penrose, it would have been useful to add the important contributions of Jack Downie (1958) , George B. Richardson (1960), and Joseph Steindl (1952) . They too emphasized firm heterogeneity and the dynamic growth process.
Another slight weakness is the tendency to sometimes oversimplify the approach of mainstream economics. For instance, in one passage, Hunt (2000) declares that both labor and capital are assumed to be homogeneous in neoclassical theory. They often are. But there are many neoclassical models with heterogeneous labor or capital. These models assume maximizing behavior and focus on equilibrium outcomes. The accusation that mainstream economists always assume labor or capital homogeneity is wrong and diverts attention from the main target.
Nevertheless, this section of Hunt's (2000) work is highly recommended reading. The core ideas are bold and important. Instead of an equilibrium conception-in which all firms gravitate to a single norm-variety and disequilibration are central. No two firms are alike in knowledge, capabilities, and other resources. A firm's portfolio of resources can lead to a particular comparative advantage, creating opportunities for higher profits. There is an immanent tendency for diverging and disequilibriating behaviors. These central ideasalbeit simple once grasped-have enormous theoretical and policy implications. Hunt does not claim to be the first to formulate these notions-they can be found in the works of Clark, Chamberlin, Penrose, Downie, and others-but his account is clear and persuasive.
AGENCY AND STRUCTURE
To build an alternative theory of competition and firms is a major challenge. Such a theory would propose a conception of human motivation, a theory of organizations, and a theory of market behavior. The outcome would be a theory that combined an understanding of individual motivations and behaviors with a conception of structural or systemic outcomes or trends. It would provide an explanation of how individual agents interact with the structural whole.
In this respect, I do not think that Hunt (2000) has yet provided a complete theory. This does not detract from the scale of his achievement so far. I concur with his final remarks in the book, in which he candidly admits that there is much more work to be done.
Consider, first, Hunt's (2000) discussion of the theory of human motivation. Both his critique of existing theory and his chosen alternative have their limitations. He alleges that utility maximization theory is empirically false because people sometimes act unselfishly. Hunt also maintains that attempts to justify the theory in the face of its "falsity" turn the thesis into a "tautology or an empty abstraction." On the contrary, and following the important work of Laurence Boland (1981) , I would argue that the notion of utility-maximizing behavior is neither falsifiable nor a tautology.
In his important article, Boland (1981) asked if any conceivable evidence would refute the standard assumptions of utility maximization. He showed that such an attempt at falsification could never work. A critic may claim he has found a consumer who is not maximizing anything. However, the defender of utility maximization can always respond, "You claim you have found a consumer who is not a maximizer but how do you know there is not something which he is maximizing?" (Boland, 1981 (Boland, , 1034 . Given that we can never in principle demonstrate that "something else" (perhaps unknown to us) is not being maximized, then the theory is invulnerable to any empirical attack. To show empirically that nothing is being maximized, we would have to measure every possible variable that could impinge on humanity, from the changing of the weather to the twinkling of the stars. Clearly, this would be an endless and impossible task. The assumption of universal utility maximization could very well be false, but as a matter of logic, we cannot prove that it is. Hence, the maximization assumption is not falsifiable. But Boland also rightly points out that it is not a tautology. It is not a tautology because it is conceivably false. It might be the case that nothing is being maximized. But we can never know.
If we are to dispense with utility-maximizing theory, then we cannot do so on the grounds that it is empirically inaccurate, that it has been falsified, or that it is a tautology. All these attacks are invalid.
However, there are good reasons for dispensing with utility maximization and considering an alternative theory. Briefly, utility maximization tells us little or nothing about the specificities of human psychology or culture. To his credit, Hunt (2000) is sensitive to many of these issues. He develops a sophisticated account involving culture and ethical judgments, as well as evaluations of self-interest. He also, quite legitimately, emphasizes cultural factors such as trust. He also distances himself from Herbert Simon's (1957) "satisficing" model because, even if previous aspiration levels are met, the firm is never satisfied with current performance. Generally, these insights are persuasive.
However, the more that we are saying something meaningful and specific about ethics, trust, and so on, the more we are dealing with historically specific cultural developments. It may be that firms are never satisfied. But being never satisfied is itself a historically specific cultural norm. It is a creation of the modern age of anxiety. In contrast, people in less complex societies were often satisfied with their lot (Sahlins 1972) .
To attack utility maximization, we have to assault the theory for its universality, rather than pointing to empirical failures. Universality or overgenerality is the problem. Hunt (2000) , however, falls into the same trap while searching for an alternative general theory. But in presupposing historically specific cultural norms such as "being never satisfied," Hunt is failing in his aim to produce a general theory. In my view, such an aim should be abandoned, at least at this level of theoretical abstraction (Hodgson 1999 ).
When we move on to consider the structural relationship between actors, we detect further gaps in Hunt's (2000) account. Much of economics and social science is concerned with structural relationships between actors and with the structural or institutional outcomes of their interaction. These outcomes may be intended or unintended. Hunt does not consider these structural issues much. For instance, despite his praise for Austrian economic theory, he does not similarly explore its notion of undesigned or spontaneous order.
A complete attack on the concept of equilibrium must show not only that individual actions are disequilibriating but also that the systemic interactions between them do not result in some type of stable or equilibrium outcome. A cloud might have a stable shape even if it is made up of numerous, unstable particles or water vapor. Chaotic interactions can result in discernible patterns. Complex systems can have emergent properties. Hunt (2000) does not explore these systemic outcomes. He has an account of agency but not of structure. Accordingly, there is little consideration of the overall outcome and systemic effects of individual profit-seeking behaviors on the whole. Hence, his dismissal of equilibrium theory is too easy. Contrary to Hunt (2000) , equilibrium does not simply result from individual firms failing to seek more profit. On the contrary, industry equilibrium is a situation in which firms cannot get any more profit, no matter how much or how little they try.
The result of this omission is that social structure is often taken for granted. For instance, Hunt (2000) emphasizes firms competing for a given market segment. However, there is not enough emphasis on the creation and manipulation of markets themselves. The question is not simply how firms take advantage of the situation and resources but also how their actions and interactions create new situations and opportunities. This gap in Hunt's account needs to be filled. He needs a theory of meso-or macroeconomic outcomes and not simply a notion of firm behavior.
RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE, AND MARKET
Hunt's (2000) central concept is that of a resource. Another of my concerns is that this concept is both too general and too vague. Hunt argues, quite reasonably, that a firm's portfolio of resources can mean a "comparative advantage in resources," leading to production at higher profits. But this insight requires elaboration. What is a resource? In one passage, Hunt considers a "policy" as a resource. In another, relations between firms are considered as resources. Information, knowledge, and routines are also regarded as resources. It becomes difficult to see what is not a resource. As Alice said in Through the Looking-Glass, "That's a great deal to make one word mean." The danger is that the concept of "resource" becomes so general that it begins to lose its meaning.
Hunt (2000) is right to emphasize the heterogeneity of resources. He persuasively warns us of the dangers of the "factors of production" concept. So far, so good. But he makes no distinction between resources of one species and those of another. I would argue that such a distinction is very important for any resource-orientated theory of the firm.
Accordingly, I would insist on a number of distinctions between different types of resources. The first distinction is between human labor, skills, or knowledge, on one hand, and material capital goods, on the other. Thorstein Veblen (1919, 343) long ago elaborated the importance of this distinction. He was one of the first to stress the relative importance of the "knowledge and practice of ways and means." For Veblen, production relied on "the accumulated, habitual knowledge of the ways and means involved . . . the outcome of long experience and experimentation" (pp. 185-86) . The production and use of all material and immaterial assets depend on elusive, immaterial circumstances and combinations of skills, which are often difficult to identify and own. These capacities reside in the institutions and culture of the socioeconomic system, and they are built up over a long period of time. Veblen (1919) invited his readers to consider what would be worse for a community: the loss of all the capital goods used in production or the loss of all knowledge and skills. The latter sacrifice, he contended, would be much more destructive because without the relevant knowledge, it would not be possible to use much of the remaining equipment. On the other hand, while the loss of material equipment would be substantial and destructive, production could be built up to former levels in a much shorter period of time, using the knowledge retained. After wholesale industrial devastation in the Second World War, the subsequent experiences of reconstruction and dynamic recovery in Germany and Japan give strong support to Veblen's argument. Veblen thus argued that "the substantial core of capital is immaterial wealth, and that the material objects which are formally the subject of the capitalist's ownership are, by comparison, a transient and adventitious matter" (p. 200).
The distinctiveness of this conceptual viewpoint should not be underestimated. Mainstream explanations of economic growth have stressed changes in factor inputs, on one hand, and technological changes driven by research and development, on the other. Emphasis on such tangible inputs and measures often has obscured the importance of learning and the accumulation of social knowledge. Kenneth Boulding was a heterodox economist who questioned mainstream treatments of information and knowledge. He wrote that economic development . . . is essentially a knowledge process . . . but we are still too much obsessed by mechanical models, capital-income ratios, and even input-output tables, to the neglect of the study of the learning process which is the real key to development. (Boulding 1966, 6) Having established the first distinction-between skills, on one hand, and material resources, on the other-we can begin to understand the role of skills and knowledge as driving economic resources and look to human learning as the major engine of economic growth (Hodgson 1999 ). This would not necessarily contradict Hunt's resource-advantage theory, but it would give it more sharpness and insight.
A second important distinction, between different types of resource, is between those that are readily marketable and those that are not. This cuts across the first distinction. Some types of knowledge and labor may be readily obtained on the market. On the other hand, much knowledge is highly tacit or contextualized and cannot be readily traded because it is not amenable to codifiable description. An example of skills that are difficult to trade is the type of knowledge locked up in organizations and cultures, much of which is tacit and preserved by routines.
Likewise with material equipment. Some items can be easily traded because they are versatile or widely used. Other assets may be specific or specialist in nature, requiring oneoff outside contracts, or are best made "in-house." This twofold division gives us four types of resource, as shown in Table 1 .
A number of speculations are possible within this framework. For example, it may be suggested that modern economies are taken up more and more with the production and use of resources type (2) and (4), rather than (1) and (3). If so, this might place limits on the use of the market mechanism. As resources become more idiosyncratic, complex, and context dependent, traders are less able to know what they are buying or selling. Ironically, such developments would also put limits on the use of central planning mechanisms. Soviet-type centrally planned economies worked best when dealing with the more straightforward aggregates (coal, steel, electricity) rather than complex machinery and specialist knowledge. The increasing complexity of twentieth-century economies may be one reason why the Soviet system fell behind and eventually collapsed. I have extended such speculations elsewhere (Hodgson 1999) .
What concerns us more at the present juncture is the implications of the above schema for Hunt's (2000) theory. It is consistent with Hunt's laudable emphasis on the highly varied and specific nature of resources. However, Hunt fails to note the implications of distinguishing between different types of resources in the above manner. For instance, if Veblen's (1919) argument is correct, it may be more important for a firm to concentrate strategically on learning and knowledge-based skills while providing material equipment as a secondary arm of the same strategy. Furthermore, the identification of the resources that are readily tradable provides a justification for buying them in, rather than producing them in-house. At the theoretical level, the marketability of some resources in a sense overcomes their heterogeneity and makes them commensurable. This is a vital point. Despite the huge variety of material and immaterial resources, the extension of markets-first regionally, then globally-brings everything under a common measure. Accordingly, even if resources are highly varied and specific, insofar as they remain marketable, then they are likely to be obtainable and replaceable by purchase in the open market. At the same time, large proportions of (especially immaterial) resources are not readily tradable and have to be developed or nurtured within organizations. Herein lies a theoretical explanation for the existence of the firm rather than a market-based arrangement (Hodgson 1998) .
CONCLUSION
Overall, Hunt's (2000) book is full of important insights. But it is not yet a complete or general theory. There is a related danger in claiming too much empirical confirmation for the theory. Some of Hunt's claims in this regard are not entirely convincing. For instance, his empirical test of his resourceadvantage versus neoclassical theory is that firm effects dominate industry effects in firm performance, suggesting that firm-specific characteristics are more important than industrial structure in explaining performance. However, the predictive "success" of resource-advantage theory in this regard follows entirely and simply from its axiomatic concentration on firm over structure. In other words, the detailed specificities of resource-advantage theory are not tested; it is simply the importance of firm-specific explanations that is seemingly confirmed by the evidence. The evidence is important, but it does not point uniquely at Hunt's own particular theory.
As another example of possibly claiming too much, Hunt (2000) asserts that resource-advantage theory explains the superiority of the capitalist market system over centrally planned economies such as of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. In focusing on the dynamic processes of innovation and performance improvement by individual firms, resource-advantage theory does indeed show the fatal weakness of attempts by Oskar Lange and others to defend "socialism" by the use of neoclassical general equilibrium theory. Resource-advantage theory thus helps to undermine a theoretical defense of central planning. However, on this and related issues, resource-advantage theory adds nothing new to standard Austrian analysis. Indeed, in explaining why a system based on private property and markets fosters innovation and productivity growth, resource-advantage simply replicates Austrian arguments.
Reservations aside, this is an important and challenging book. Hunt (2000) is fully aware that there is much more work to be done. Those who wish to follow down this road can usefully build on his insights. One day, perhaps, we shall then have an understanding of the modern market system that will have the weight and prestige to displace the empty formalism that passes for much of mainstream economics today.
